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INSIDER TRADING PROSECUTION UNDER SECTION 
10b AND RULE 10b-5: BALANCING NEWMAN AND 
SALMAN 
        
         Porter R. Strickler*1 
INTRODUCTION 
Two recent cases from different federal circuit courts have recently come to very 
different conclusions with respect to defining the requirements of an insider trading conviction.  
The Second Circuit’s Newman decision was decided on December 10, 2014 and within just 
seven months the Ninth Circuit issued its Salman decision that rejected Newman’s narrow 
conception of insider trading.  The Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit have created a 
contentious split with their differing interpretations of Supreme Court precedent, which could 
have tremendous impact on the prosecution and defense of financial services insiders and 
financial analysts.2  This is especially true as the Second Circuit hears a very large number of 
financial trading cases.3  Insider trading prosecutions are myriad in the modern financial world.  
In addition to the vast quantity of insider trading that occurs within Wall Street, a large number 
of these instances have been brought to the public’s attention and prosecuted by the U.S. 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Preet Bharara.  As U.S. Attorney he has applied 
                                                          
1 * J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Villanova University.  
2 Bartlett, Talarides & Blair, The Ripple Effects of U.S. v. Newman, http://blogs.orrick.com/securities-
litigation/2016/03/02/the-ripple-effects-of-u-s-v-newman-continue-sec-lifts-administrative-bar-on-downstream-
insider-trading-tippee-and-tipper-requests-that-third-circuit-vacate-sec-settlement/ (April 18, 2016). 
3 Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Of course, Newman is not binding on us, and our own reading 
of Dirks is guided by the clearly applicable language italicized above. But we would not lightly ignore the most 
recent ruling of our sister circuit in an area of law that it has frequently encountered.”) 
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a renewed focus on prosecuting financial fraud.4  From the amount of insider trading cases he 
has brought and won during his appointment it seems to be a hallmark of his term.5   
 In Dirks v. SEC the Supreme Court held that “not only are insiders forbidden by their 
fiduciary relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their 
advantage, but they also may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper 
purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain.”6  The fact that a personal gain is 
required by the test set forth in Dirks left no doubt as to its necessity, but it and its progeny have 
left uncertain of what is sufficient to satisfy the standard of a personal benefit or evidence such a 
gain.   
 In Newman two hedge fund managers Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson, were 
charged with insider trading in Dell and NVIDIA stock.  It was alleged that, “a cohort of analysts 
at various hedge funds and investment firms obtained material, nonpublic information from 
employees of publicly traded technology companies, shared it amongst each other, and 
subsequently passed this information to the portfolio managers at their respective companies.”7 
The government was able to prove that Newman and Chiasson had received and traded on inside 
information that they received through an extenuated tipping chain from their respective funds’ 
analysts.  The government argued that the social relationship between the tipper and tippees, 
including career advice and attending church together, should be a sufficient personal benefit.  
The Second Circuit disagreed holding that to the extent a personal benefit may be inferred from a 
                                                          
4 Meet the U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara, U.S. Attor. SDNY, https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/meet-us-attorney 
(April 18, 2016).   
5 Jonathan Marino, Preet Bharara was the undefeated top cop of Wall Street – but now his legacy is in question, 
Business Insider (April 18, 2016) http://www.businessinsider.com/preet-bharara-was-once-the-undefeated-top-cop-
of-wall-street-but-that-has-all-changed-2015-10  
6 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983). 
7 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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relationship, “such an inference is impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close 
personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents 
at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”8 The Second Circuit’s 
holding indicates that the tippee must know of the personal benefit to the tipper, no matter how 
far removed in the tipping chain.  The results of the trades in Dell and NVIDIA stock were huge, 
with Newman earning four million dollars in profit for his fund Level Global, and Chiasson 
earning sixty-eight million dollars in profit for his fund Diamondback. 
 In Salman the case arose from an alleged insider trading chain which involved members 
of an extended family.  The tipper Maher Kara, worked for an investment bank and provided 
confidential information to his brother about the upcoming mergers and acquisitions of the 
bank’s clients.  His brother then went on to tip Salman because his sister was engaged to Maher 
Kara.  Kara testified at trial that the information had been given to benefit the tippee and that the 
tipper and tippee shared a close mutually beneficial relationship.  The district court then went on 
to convict Salman of insider trading.  On appeal the Ninth Circuit rejected Salman’s request that 
they adopt the Newman rule, instead they regarded the close personal relationship as a sufficient 
personal benefit.  The Ninth Circuit rejected Salman’s argument as construing Newman too 
narrowly, and affirmed the district court’s judgement.  The Court reasoned that liability exists 
where, “the insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”9  
They also expressed concern that if Salman’s argument prevailed, insiders could disclose 
confidential information to whomever they chose, as long as they did not ask for “tangible” 
compensation in return.10 
                                                          
8 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).  
9 United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664).  
10 Id. at 1094. 
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The Ninth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Dirks in the Newman 
case.  The crux of the disagreement lies within their definition of the personal-benefit 
requirement.  Newman appears to contradict its past precedent in cases such as Jiau, and also to 
have severely limited future insider trading prosecutions in the Second Circuit.11  The Ninth 
Circuit’s approach seeks to keep a broad scope of liability for insider trading enforcement under 
Section 10(b).  Their holding was crafted with the fears that insiders could trade to benefit 
relatives or friends with only pre-textual reasons and escape liability.  A very simple trick to 
obviate the the law’s prohibitions would be all that was required to entirely circumvent liability 
by simply asking for nothing pecuniary or tangible in return.12 
 The possible implications of the Newman decision have been predicted to be tremendous 
with the government acknowledging that the decision, “will dramatically limit the Government’s 
ability to prosecute some of the most common, culpable, and market-threatening forms of insider 
trading” and “arguably represents one of the most significant developments in insider trading law 
in a generation.”13  The fear that insiders will be able to benefit their relatives, friends, and really 
anyone they wish with impunity smacks in the face of our common notions of fairness and how 
to properly achieve the ‘American Dream’.  That insiders and financial experts will be able to 
“game the system” at the expense of the American public threatens the entire financial system’s 
integrity.  The outcome of the petition to the Supreme Court could have broader societal 
implications in addition to financial regulation concerns, such as exacerbating or escalating 
                                                          
11 United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013) (‘"Personal benefit" is "broadly defined . . . [to] include[] 
not only 'pecuniary gain,'" Obus, 693 F.3d at 285(quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663), but also, inter alia, any 
"reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings," Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663, and "the benefit one would 
obtain from simply 'mak[ing] a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.'" Obus, 693 F.3d at 
285 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664). The existence of "a relationship between the insider and the recipient that 
suggests a quid pro quofrom the latter, or an intention to benefit the [latter]" may be sufficient to justify an inference 
of personal benefit. Id. at 664.’) 
12 Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1094 (2015). 
13 Petition of U.S. for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc in United States v. Newman at 3 (Jan. 23, 2015). 
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tensions surrounding wealth disparity in the United States.  How this split is resolved, by either 
the Supreme Court or Congress will define how the American securities markets are regulated.  
The Court is scheduled to hear the decision in Fall of 2016, during a contentious presidential 
election season and with an increasingly disparate wealth structure between the different classes 
in the United States.14  
 
In Part I, I will briefly describe the development of the history of tipper-tippee insider 
trading liability.  This will include a discussion of early state law regulations which have 
developed into the present regime where the federal securities laws predominate.  The 
interpretations of the Securities Exchange Act of 193415, by the Supreme Court will be 
explained, encompassing the waves of expansion and retraction of its scope of liability.  Part II 
will start by giving a detailed explanation of the progression of these cases.  It will provide an 
understanding of the Court’s reasoning in the Dirks decision, and how the recent Newman and 
Salman cases have culminated in the Circuit Split, for which this paper now seeks to present a 
solution.  Part III will develop the current understanding of insider trading liability with respect 
to tippers and tippees.  This section will examine the competing views of what is the proper 
requirement for a personal benefit, and will also discuss how this requirement interacts with the 
scienter requirement.  The section will end with a discussion providing the basis for my solution 
to balance the competing aims of the government, the public, the commission, financial 
professionals, and investors.  
                                                          
14 For further discussion of this issue See, G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, 
http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html (April 18, 2016); Chad Stone, A Guide to Statistics on 
Historical Trends in Income Inequality, http://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/a-guide-to-statistics-
on-historical-trends-in-income-inequality (April 18, 2016). 
15 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. 
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I.  BACKGROUND – BRIEF HISTORY of INSIDER TRADING LAW 
Insider trading has not always been regulated as extensively as it is today.16  Like many 
other aspects of business in the 19th century, insider trading was completely regulated under 
state laws, which proved to be ineffective, and that some commentators believe contributed to 
the decline of the economy leading to the Great Depression.17  Starting in the early 20th century 
prosecution of fraud was entirely done through the common law of fraud by the states.18  The 
original intent of state securities laws was to protect consumers from being misled or swindled 
by unscrupulous securities sellers, especially as securities’ regulation among the states had only 
recent origins in Kansas in 1911.19  The law of fraud was applied to prevent fraud in the sale of 
securities just as it had been applied previously under other common law doctrine to prevent 
fraud in contracts for other goods and services.20  Yet, these efforts proved to be inadequate as 
                                                          
16 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW, 288-290 (3d. ed. 2011); See Steve Thel, 
The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 385 (1990); See, 
e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1994) (stating that 
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 "embrace a fundamental purpose … to substitute 
a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor.") 
17 SYMPOSIUM: CURRENT ISSUES IN SECURITIES REGULATION: Introductory Comment: A Historical 
Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934., 49 Ohio St. L.J. 329, 332 
(1988) (Many states boasted of great success with their blue sky legislation, but there was little documented proof as 
to their effectiveness. In reality, the laws proved quite ineffective for several reasons. First, responsibility for the 
enforcement of these laws was delegated to "unspecialized attorneys working for state officials as disparate as the 
railroad commission or the state auditor. When political administrations changed, responsibility for blue sky law 
enforcement frequently also was reassigned." In addition to the lack of expertise among the enforcers, state funding 
was generally inadequate to support the fulltime manpower needed to investigate the securities and to take remedial 
or prosecutorial action. Also, many states were deliberately lax in the regulation of securities traffic in order to 
attract outside industry and to prevent the exodus of industry to more lenient states.) 
18 See United States v. Watkins, 278 F.3d 961, 966-69 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Unlike fraud with its [common law] history 
in torts as a cause of action and term of art defined by its elements, 'intent to mislead' does not necessarily enjoy 
such a clear or distinguished pedigree.").  
19 Mindy Olson, The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act: More Effective Than Current 
Regulation?, 30 Iowa J. Corp. L. 425, 426 (2005). (“Many states then enacted securities laws called blue-sky laws. 
Kansas was the first state to adopt “blue-sky” laws in 1911, and forty-seven states adopted them before 1931. These 
laws attempted to stop the sale of fraudulent securities.”) See also, Larry E. Ribstein, Commentary: Bubble Laws, 40 
Hous. L. Rev. 77, 91 (2003) (After state regulation was thought to have failed, the first enactment of Federal 
Securities laws occurred after the 1929 market crash.) 
20 Id. at 426-427 (Kansas state statute was based on broad criteria, “such as if the issues does not intend to do a fair 
and honest business or does not promise a fair return.”  Additionally, the New York state statute requires the New 
York Attorney General to, “show that the perpetrators, which may include corporations, individuals, investment 
banks or other third parties, have committed an intentional act that constitutes fraud.”); Watkins, 278 F.3d 961, 965 
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the complexity of securities markets grew and the state laws were inconsistently enforced.21  
Securities sales often spanned multiple states, and could encompass many buyers and sellers 
before the fraud was brought to the attention of law enforcement.22  Additionally, before the 
passage of the federal securities acts, most of what we think of today as classic illegal insider 
trading transactions were commonly accepted.23  Which forms of insider trading were considered 
fraudulent varied from state to state.24  In the 1909 case of Strong v. Repide, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged the common law rule of fraud as a cause of action in the securities market for the 
first time, but held that it was unnecessary to create a separate cause of action for securities fraud 
in this case as there was fraud in procuring the contracts from the plaintiffs for the sale of their 
land.25  Therefore the securities had to be rescinded under the common law of contracts.26  In 
response to cases like Strong, and the hesitancy of the Court to apply fraud to securities sales, 
Congress enacted section 10 (b) of the ’34 Act which focused primarily on fraud in securities 
transactions.27  However, the only provision of the Act which explicitly addressed insider trading 
was Section 16 (b) that prohibited insider short-swing speculative profits.28  Congress passed the 
SEC Rule 14(e-3) in the 1980s, in conjunction with section 14(e) from the 1960s to outright 
                                                          
(9th Cir. 2002) ("Where Congress uses terms such as defraud that have accumulated settled meaning under the . . 
. common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the 
established meaning of those terms."). 
21 SYMPOSIUM, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 329 (1988).  Shalini M. Aggarwal, From the Individual to the Institution: The 
SEC's Evolving Strategy for Regulating the Capital Markets, 2003 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 581, 585 (describing the 
reasons for ineffectiveness of the state laws as leading to the passage of federal legislation to provide "additional 
protections to investors"). 
22 Id. at 331. 
23 Jeanne F. Doyle, The Fraud on the Market Theory: A Unified Concept of Causation in Rule 10b-5 Open Market 
Actions, 12 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 727, 730 (1981) (“This judicially-created private cause of action, on the other hand, 
enabled victims of past fraudulent activities to be compensated for their injuries and substantially improved the 
effective enforcement of the 1934 Act.”) See also, Stock Exchange Practices, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1934). 
24 Id. at 334-337; Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L.J. 171 (1933). 
25 Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). 
26 7-28 Corbin on Contracts § 28.13 (2015). 
27 Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). 
28 78 U.S.C. § 78n(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1; 78 U.S.C. § 78p(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3. 
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prohibit insider trading on tender offers.29  Both sections are fairly straightforward because they 
pertain to only a specific, limited set of transactions and have strict liability for trading on the 
information, as no proof of scienter is required.30  Largely because of these characteristics 
section 14 (e) and 16 (b) are rarely contested by defendants other than as to the establishment of 
the predicate facts of a particular case.31   
An essential element of a fraud claim is to demonstrate that the defendant acted with 
scienter.32  Scienter in the context of fraud litigation means the defendant acted specifically with 
the “intent to deceive”, as the Supreme Court decided in Ernst & Ernst.33  Lower courts applying 
the standard, have ruled that recklessness is sufficient for fraud convictions, but the Supreme 
Court has not yet decided this issue.  Rule 10b–5 describes the type of conduct proscribed, but it 
does not detail the appropriate standard of culpability.34  Twenty years of conflicting cases over 
whether scienter was even required elapsed, and then finally in 1976 the Supreme Court held in 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, that under Rule 10b-5 it must be proven that the defendant acted 
with scienter.35  In the context of a criminal prosecution of insider trading, the prosecutor also 
                                                          
29 WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN,  COMMENTIARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW 
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 618 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2012).     
30 Id. at 620. 
31 Id. at 625. But see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Livingston, 566 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(Reversing the District Court’s interpretation of what type of information is captured in Section 16(b).  The court 
reasoned that the lower court was incorrect in its application of the Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78p (1971).  “Insider 
information within the meaning of Section 16(b) encompasses that kind of confidential information about a 
company's affairs that would help the particular employee make decisions affecting market transactions in his 
employer's securities.” Holding, “[Defendant] did not receive insider information within the meaning of Section 
16(b).”; Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973). e.g. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 
(Sept. 12, 1980). 
32 7-28 Corbin on Contracts § 28.13 (2015) (“Tortious fraud—the action of deceit—involves five elements, each of 
them, although tersely stated, is quite complex: (1) representation; (2) falsity; (3) scienter; (4) deception; and 
(5) injury.”). 
33 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) 
34 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
35 United States v. Stewart, 305 F.Supp.2d 368, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Hochfelder supra n.32, at 193 (“The 
Supreme Court has held that scienter or intent in the civil securities fraud context, indicates a ‘mental state 
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud’ and is a required element of any claim of securities fraud.”)  
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must establish that the defendant acted willfully, which means that the defendant acted with the 
realization that the acts are wrongful.36  
Although intentional deceit and fraud are definitely encompassed in the prohibitions of 
the rule, it is less clear if recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement.  Conduct 
that falls short of a willful misrepresentation were no presented in the Supreme Court’s 
Hochfelder and Aaron decisions.37  While the recklessness question remains unresolved at the 
Supreme Court level, the vast majority of the circuit and district court decisions have found that 
recklessness is sufficient to state a claim under 10b–5.38 
 Section 10 (b) has been interpreted broadly, and has been the main tool for the SEC and 
the Department of Justice in prosecuting insider trading.39  The SEC Rule 10(b)-5, similarly 
enacts the provisions of section 10(b) but in more specific terms.  To better clarify, section 10b is 
the antifraud provision of the Exchange Act, while Rule 10b-5 is the rule the SEC promulgated 
under that section.  The modern era of insider trading prosecutions began with the SEC’s 
application of Rule 10 (b)-5 in the case, In re Cady, Roberts & Co.40  This interpretation was 
                                                          
36 Id. at 372. 
37 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 690 (1980) (“To premise civil liability under § 10 (b) on merely negligent conduct, 
the Court concluded, would run counter to the fact that wherever Congress intended to accomplish that result, it said 
so expressly and subjected such actions to significant procedural restraints not applicable to § 10 (b) ... In fact, 
since Hochfelder involved an implied cause of action that was not within the contemplation of the Congress that 
enacted § 10 (b), id., at 196, it would be quite anomalous in a case like the present one, involving as it does the 
express remedy Congress created for § 10 (b) violations, not to attach at least as much significance to the fact that 
the statutory language and its legislative history support a scienter requirement.”). 
38 The stringent recklessness standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit has been phrased in terms of deliberate or 
conscious recklessness. See, e.g., Employers Teamsters Local Nos. 175 and 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Clorox Co., 
353 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2004). As other courts have put it: ‘‘[a]n egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to 
investigate the doubtful, may in some cases give rise to an inference of recklessness.’’ MBI Acquisition Partners v. 
Chronical Publishing Co., 301 F.Supp.2d 873 (W.D. Wis. 2002), (quoting Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F.Supp. 
1246, 1255 (N.D.Ill. 1997) and Goldman v. McMahan, Brafman, Morgan & Co., 706 F.Supp. 256, 259 
(S.D.N.Y.1989)). 
39 Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 353, Pages (1988) 
40 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). David Cowan Bayne, Insider Trading: The Demise of the 
Misappropriation Theory--and Thereafter, 41 St. Louis L.J. 625, 652 (Thus in 1961 in "a case of first impression" 
for the SEC, the talented Chairman Cary wrote, for a unanimous Commission, the vanguard Cady,Roberts & Co. 
Cady, Roberts has endured as the ideal paradigm: ‘Insider Gintel's direct privity trade on the NYSE with hundreds 
of anonymous victims posed a narrow insider-trading question for the Commission, uncluttered and perfect as "a 
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perhaps the strictest form of insider trading liability to date.  The case was an SEC administrative 
ruling, and even though it did not ultimately become the law, it laid the basis for how section 
10(b) would be interpreted later by the federal courts.41  In Cady, the Curtiss-Wright 
Corporation’s board of directors decided to reduce the company’s quarterly dividend.42  Cheever 
Cowdin, a member of the board of directors at Curtiss-Wright also served as a partner at the 
stock brokerage firm of Cady, Roberts & Company.  Cowdin privately leaked information about 
the Curtiss-Wright dividend cut to another partner at Cady, Roberts before the news was publicly 
announced.43  Relying on the information, the partner at the brokerage firm sold several thousand 
shares of Curtiss-Wright stock that had been held in customer accounts before the 
announcement, and consequently before the company’s stock declined in value.   This case fell 
into the tipper-tippee liability category of insider trading as well as the traditional theory.  It was 
novel at the time for the fact that it took place over an impersonal stock exchange which was a 
new technology transitioning from solely face-to-face transactions.44  In Cady, Roberts which 
was an administrative opinion by the SEC, it was decided that the information belonged to the 
corporation, and therefore that any use of it by an individual for personal profit fell within the 
                                                          
case of first impression."’) (quoting David Cowan Bayne, The Insider’s Natural-Law Duty: Chiarella and the 
Fiduciary Fallacy, 19 J. Corp. L. 681 (1994)).  
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 909. (“Sometime after the dividend decision, there was a recess of the Curtiss-Wright directors’ meeting, 
during which Cowdin telephoned registrant’s office and left a message for Gintel that the dividend had been cut.  
Upon receiving this information, Gintel entered two sell orders for execution on the Exchange, one to sell 2,000 
shares of Curtiss-Wright stock for ten accounts, and the other to sell short 5,000 shares for 11 accounts.  Four 
hundred of the 5,000 shares were sold for three of Cowdin’s customers.  According to Cowdin, pursuant to 
directions from his clients, he had given instructions to Gintel to take profits on these 400 shares if the stock took a 
“run-up.”  These orders were executed at 11:15 and 11:18 a.m. at 40-1/4 and 40-3/8, respectively.”) 
43 Michael H. Dessent, Joe Six-Pack, United States v. O’Hagan, and Private Securities Litigation Reform: A Line 
Must Be Drawn, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1137, 1159 (1998) (David Cowdin, an investment banker with Cady and a director 
at Curtiss-Wright, attended a board meeting of Curtiss-Wright.  There he learned of the decision to reduce the 
dividend.  Cowdin left the board room to call a Cady partner to inform him of the new information before it was 
publicly released.  Relying on this information the firm sold Curtiss-Wright stock in all of its customers’ accounts.  
It also sold borrowed stock at the current market price in anticipation of a price decline after public disclosure of the 
dividend cut, when it would then purchase an equivalent number of shares, effectively selling short.) 
44 Jerry W. Markham and Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of Exchange Trading Floors and 
the Growth of ECNs, 33 Iowa J. Corp. L. 865, 874 (2008). 
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prohibitions of Rule 10b-5.45  The SEC argued that when a corporate insider has material non-
public information (MNPI) regarding the corporation, they have a duty to disclose the 
information publicly or to abstain from trading on it all together.46  The duty was very broad and 
included within its scope anyone who held material non-public information regardless of the 
source, or extent of the knowledge of the possessor.47 Therefore, an individual with MNPI would 
either have to disclose it to the market publicly, thereby eliminating any possible trade advantage 
resulting from the information, or abstain from any trading in the company’s stock.48  The 
“disclose or abstain rule” was based on an equality of information principle, where a pure 
equality of information amongst traders was to be thought to be desired and enforced.49  To 
enforce the equality standard required a flat and complete prohibition that forbade any trading  
using MNPI if it was not disclosed publicly.50  The SEC was soon forced to realize by later 
judicial opinions that the Cady, Roberts rationale was completely untenable, as information 
asymmetries can arise from purely benign reasons not related to insiders of a company, and these 
asymmetries could possibly be to the benefit of a corporation or simply the result of probability 
alone.51 
                                                          
45 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
46 Dessent, Joe Six-Pack, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1137 (1998). 
47 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961). 
48 Id. at 914. 
49 Id. at 913 (“We cannot accept respondents' contention that an insider's responsibility is limited to existing 
stockholders and that he has no special duties when sales of securities are made to non-stockholders. This approach 
is too narrow. It ignores the plight of the buying public -- wholly unprotected from the misuse of special 
information.”). 
50 Id. 
51 Dessent, Joe Six-Pack, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1137, 1160 (“Cady, Roberts gave the courts a starting point to 
evolve § 10(b) on the new rationale that it gave the outsider-investor a more level playing field in the stock market. 
Its assumption, of course, was that outsiders are innocent parties whom the law should be expected to protect. 
Events in the next few decades explored this question more carefully and offered quite a different answer.”). 
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In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. the second circuit relied on the equality of information 
theory to develop the “disclose or abstain” rule suggested in Cady, Roberts.52  In effect this rule 
virtually required there to be a parity of information among all traders of a company’s stock 
implicitly endorsing this part of Cady, Roberts as well.  Whereas later this standard would be 
narrowed by the second circuit in Chiarella to an ‘equality of access’ from the realization that a 
complete parity of information was impossible.53  The directors and officers of the mining 
company traded in its stock after a vast discovery of mineral deposits, in territory the company 
was set to acquire.  They did so while in possession of material information and affirmatively 
misrepresenting publicly that no such discovery had been made.54  The Court held that corporate 
insiders had no duty to disclose the information, if they had not traded in the stock themselves.  
The reasoning was that companies have a right to decide to keep information secret or as here 
keep the discoveries secret for business reasons, such in order to obtain a favorable price for the 
land that still needed to be purchased for the mining site.55  Because they traded on the stock 
however, the Second Circuit found that while in possession of the MNPI, even if the directors 
did not owe a duty to disclose the information to the public, that if they trade while possessing 
the information they must disclose it publicly before doing so or abstain from trading in the stock 
                                                          
52 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (“Thus, anyone in possession of material inside 
information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a 
corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities 
concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.”) 
53 Francisco A. Loayza, The Remote Tippee Dilemma: Resolving Tippee Liability More Than Thirty Years After 
Dirks v. SEC, 52 Cal. W. L. Rev. 109, 119 (2015) (“It would not be until several years later that the Supreme Court 
severely limited Texas Gulf by narrowing the right to a private cause of action under 10b-5 to purchasers or sellers. 
Yet, because the Supreme Court did not directly reject the equal access theory, the Second Circuit would again 
implement it to uphold a conviction in U.S. v. Chiarella.”) 
54 Supra note 51 at 846. 
55 Id. at 843. (“This visual estimate convinced TGS that it was desirable to acquire the remainder of the Kidd 55 
segment, and in order to facilitate this acquisition TGS President Stephens instructed the exploration group to keep 
the results of K-55-1 confidential and undisclosed even as to other officers, directors, and employees of TGS. The 
hole was concealed and a barren core was intentionally drilled off the anomaly.”) 
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altogether.56  The SEC proposed an aggressive stance towards insider trading, and the Second 
Circuit agreed that, “any possession of relevant, material, nonpublic information gives rise to a 
duty to disclose or abstain from trading.”57  This was intended to assure that all investors trading 
on an impersonal stock exchange have equal access to material information.58  Before the 
Supreme Court weighed in on insider trading in Chiarella, a case to be discussed later in the 
paper, the lower federal courts largely followed this interpretation of section 10 (b) without much 
guidance from the legislature or the Supreme Court.59  
 In a case occurring just a few years after Texas Gulph, but before Chiarella, the Supreme 
Court signaled an intent to preserve state law regulation of internal corporate affairs, and to 
delimit Rule 10 (b-5) from extending too far into state corporate governance matters.60  A 
notable case in this area was Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, where the court limited a 
director’s breach of fiduciary duty, only to minority shareholders in a cash-out merger and only 
to state law appraisal rights in accordance with the law of states’ fraud provisions.61  In Santa Fe 
minority shareholders objected to a short-form cash-out merger in order to get what they 
believed to be a fair price for their shares.62  However, in place of their appraisal rights they 
decided to pursue their case under Rule 10 (b-5).63  The Court clearly set forth that this type of 
                                                          
56 Id. at 848. (“So, it is here no justification for insider activity that disclosure was forbidden by the legitimate 
corporate objective of acquiring options to purchasethe land surrounding the exploration site; if the information was, 
as the SEC contends, material, its possessors should have kept out of the market until disclosure was accomplished.” 
Cady, Roberts.) 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 864. 
59 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 
(3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 28 (2d Cir. 1979). 
60 Joseph Urgese, United States v. O'Hagan : Rule 10b-5, the "Judicial Oak Which Has Grown From Little More 
Than a Legislative Acorn," and the Antifraud Legislation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 31 Akron L. 
Rev. 431, 432. (In each of these cases the Supreme Court was charged with interpreting the scope of § 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule 10b-5.) 
61 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 466 (1977). 
62 Id. at 467. 
63 Id. 
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claim was not permissible even under the broad anti-fraud language of Rule 10 (b-5) because it 
was not a manipulation or deception required under the federal law.64 
A.  Federal Case Law Surrounding Section 10b and Rule 10b-5 
The disclose or abstain theory primarily dominated the federal prosecutions of insider 
trading until 1980 when the Supreme Court decided Chiarella v. United States.65  The Supreme 
Court attempted to confine the SEC’s broad view of insider trading liability in two cases the year 
before Chiarella.66 The case did not rule on the misappropriation theory as it was not presented 
in the court below, but it did set the groundwork for modern day misappropriation liability.67  In 
later opinions applying the misappropriation theory mentioned Chiarella it also confined all 
Section 10 (b) violations to those where a breach of duty of some sort can be found, and that a 
conviction cannot rest on mere possession of MNPI.68  Therefore, the court was able to clarify 
the traditional theory of insider trading by demonstrating that Chiarella did not fall under its 
proscriptions.  Chiarella was acquitted because he had no fiduciary duty to the acquiring or target 
companies.69  He only would have been guilty under the misappropriation theory which was not 
                                                          
64 Id. at 474. (It is our judgment that the transaction, if carried out as alleged in the complaint, was neither deceptive 
nor manipulative and therefore did not violate either § 10(b) of the Act or Rule 10b-5.) 
65 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, 85 (2d ed. 2009). 
66 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980) (“As we have emphasized before, the 1934 Act cannot be 
read "'more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit.'" Touche Ross & Co. 
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979), quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978).). 
67 Id. at 236 (“The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was convicted merely because of his failure to 
disclose material, non-public information to sellers from whom he bought the stock of target corporations. The jury 
was not instructed on the nature or elements of a duty owed by petitioner to anyone other than the sellers. Because 
we cannot affirm a criminal conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury…we will not speculate 
upon whether such a duty exists, whether it has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a violation of § 
10 (b).”). 
68 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997) (“In particular, we address and these issues: (1) Is a person 
who trades in securities for personal profit, using confidential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary 
duty to the source of the information, guilty of violating § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5? … Our answer to the first question 
is yes.”) 
69 Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). 
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before the court.  Chiarella established an insider trading fiduciary duty requirement in place of 
the equality of access to information theory that the SEC had been advocating.70   
The facts of Chiarella were unusual compared to what had traditionally been considered 
insider trading.  He was an employee of Pandick Press, which was a company that prepared and 
printed tender offer disclosure materials.71  The acquiring company, and the target company 
Pandick, had redacted their names in the disclosure materials to preserve confidentiality, but 
Chiarella was able to deduce the companies’ names from the surrounding words and 
information.72  The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, squarely rejecting the equal access to 
information notion.73  The Court’s problem with his conviction in the lower court was that he 
was said to have violated section 10 (b), but he was not a corporate insider nor did he receive any 
confidential information from the acquiring or target company.  Instead of being a corporate 
insider he was only in the confidence of Pandick Press not the target company whom the 
information belonged to.74  The court suggested that he may have owed some duty to the printing 
company to keep the information confidential, thus suggesting that the misappropriations theory 
might be applicable, but it could not decide the issue under that framework as it had not been 
raised or presented to the jury below.75  The Court went on to acquit Chiarella holding that, 
“when the defendant is charged with non-disclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to 
speak.”76 A ‘duty to speak’ means that the possessor of the inside information have a duty to 
                                                          
70 Id. at 236. 
71 Id. at 222. 
72 Id. at 225. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 243-244. (The jury was charged that "[in] simple terms, the charge is that Chiarella wrongfully took 
advantage of information he acquired in the course of his confidential position at Pandick Press and secretly used 
that information when he knew other people trading in the securities market did not have access to the same 
information that he had at a time when he knew that that information was material to the value of the stock.") 
75 Id. at 236. (“We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it was not submitted to the jury.”) 
76 Id. 
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disclose the material information to the public.77  An affirmative duty can arise when an insider, 
a tippee, or another entrusted in a confidential relationship must disclose the information publicly 
before he is able to trade while in possession of the information to avoid 10(b) liability.  The 
fiduciary has the duty to not disadvantage the principal for personal gain.  The duty does not 
arise from the mere fact of possession of MNPI, but instead must be based on a relationship of 
trust or confidentiality.78  Thus, there must be some connection between the possessor and the 
source of the information.  However, this does not need to be a direct connection, but can be 
derivative of another’s duty as in tipper, tippee liability.79 
 Another seminal case that followed three years later was Dirks v. SEC, where the Court 
set the modern standard of tipper-tippee liability insider trading.80  The Supreme Court helped to 
define the standards for insider trading in conjunction with the new fiduciary relationship 
requirement held to be necessary in Chiarella.81  In Dirks the defendant was an officer of a New 
York broker-dealer firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company 
securities to institutional investors.82  A former officer of Equity Funding of America gave Dirks 
information that the company’s assets were vastly overstated as a result of fraudulent corporate 
practices.83  Dirks commenced an independent investigation and found that there was a 
substantial basis for the allegations of fraud based on this tip.84  Dirks contacted a Los Angeles 
                                                          
77 Id. at 237 (“There can be no fraud absent a duty to speak when an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, 
and a duty to disclose under 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information, such 
duty arising, rather, from a specific relationship between parties.”) 
78 Id. 
79 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 666 (1983). (“In the absence of a breach of duty to the shareholders by the insiders, 
there was no derivative breach by Dirks.”) 
80 Id. at 649. 
81 Id. at 657. (“In effect, the SEC’s theory of tippee liability in both cases [Chiarella and Dirks] appears rooted in 
the idea that the antifraud provisions require equal information among all traders.  This conflicts with the principle 
set forth in Chiarella that only some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred from trading while in 
possession of material nonpublic information.”). 
82 Id. at 649. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. 
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newspaper to publish the story, however the newspaper did not believe his story and did not 
publish it allegedly for fear of being liable for slander or defamation.85  Dirks then openly 
discussed the information with a number of clients and investors, some of whom sold their 
holdings in Equity Funding securities.86  When the fraud was finally revealed Equity Securities 
immediately went into receivership.  Afterwards the SEC then  brought a section 10 (b) violation 
against Dirks for giving the information to his clients.87  The SEC claimed that Dirks had a duty 
to refrain from trading on the MNPI because tippees must either publicly disclose the 
information or refrain from trading altogether.88  The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Chiarella 
holding and reiterated that there is no general duty to disclose before trading on material 
nonpublic information, and that such a duty arises only from the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship.89  Dirks applied Chiarella’s conception of duty-first liability, to the context of the 
tipper-tippee relationship.90  The Court also attempted to narrow the concept of what constitutes 
an improper tip to include only certain relationships where the tipper expects to receive some 
type of gain.91  In contrast to the policy implications of the zealous draconian equal access 
regime that can be inferred from some of the Court’s earlier jurisprudence, Dirks represented an 
                                                          
85 Id. at 650. (“William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal’s Los Angeles bureau chief.  Dirks urged Blundell to write 
a story on the fraud allegations.  Blundell did not believe, however, that such a massive fraud could go undetected 
and declined to write the story.  He feared that publishing such damaging hearsay might be libelous.”) 
86 Id. at 649. (“Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity Funding stock, but throughout his 
investigation he openly discussed the information he had obtained with a number of clients and investors. Some of 
these persons sold their holdings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment advisers who liquidated 
holdings of more than $ 16 million.”) 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 659. 
90 Id. (“As we noted in Chiarella, ‘[the] tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant 
after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty.’”) 
91 Id. 
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appreciation for the possible chilling effect that over prosecution of insider trading and 
possession of inside information may have on financial analysts and traders generally.92    
 The Supreme Court then went on to define insider trading further, specifically in the 
context of the tipper-tippee relationship.  The Court held that there are two essential elements 
that compose a breach of the fiduciary duty claim, as the liability arises not from mere 
possession of MNPI, but from the desire to stop a corporate insider from vicariously achieve 
through a tippee what he himself would be prohibited from doing.93  The prohibition the Court 
decided extends to a corporate insider personally profiting from information that was only 
intended to be used for the corporation’s benefit and entrusted to him under a fiduciary 
relationship of trust and confidence.94  Thus the liability to the tippee is an extension of the 
original duty of the insider turned tipper, to the corporation.  This follows because there is 
essentially no substantive difference in the harm that results to a corporation from a tippee doing 
what the tipper could not.  The Supreme Court described the scenario like this: 
The initial inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider.  This 
requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a 
direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or 
a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.95 
This relationship does not have to be proved by direct evidence as, “There are objective facts and 
circumstances that often justify such an inference.”96  In such a case, “a relationship between the 
                                                          
92 WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN,  COMMENTIARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW 
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, 620 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2012). 
93 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
94 Id. at 659. (“Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally using undisclosed 
corporate information to their advantage, but they also may not give such information to an outsider for the same 
improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain.”) 
95 Id. at 663.  
96 Id. at 664. 
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insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the 
particular recipient” can be sufficient to warrant the inference.97 Additionally, “the elements of 
fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift 
of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”, with the main idea being that these 
tip and trade schemes are almost identical to, “trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of 
the profits to the recipient.”98  The Court made clear that not all insiders’ tips constitute a breach 
of an insider’s fiduciary duty.99  In order for there to be a breach of a fiduciary duty, the 
disclosure must be either directly or indirectly intended to benefit the individual rather than the 
company.  To decipher the intent to benefit, one must consider the presence of scienter for the 
tipper, relating to why the information was revealed and also whether the insider will personally 
benefit directly or indirectly from the disclosure.100  Both the scienter and the personal benefit 
test are intended to achieve a more exact definition of the breach of fiduciary duty by an 
insider.101  The Supreme Court ultimately left the interpretation open for additional categories of 
what defines a benefit, but gave a rough outline that it must be a pecuniary gain, or at least a 
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.102  The Supreme Court held that a 
relationship that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit a particular 
recipient is sufficient for an insider trading conviction.103  Exploitation of nonpublic information 
                                                          
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 661-662 (“In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary 
to determine whether the insider's "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty. All disclosures of 
confidential corporate information are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders.”) 
 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 666. (“The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding’s secrets, nor was 
their purpose to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks.  As the facts of this case clearly indicate the tippers 
were motivated by a desire to expose fraud.”) 
103 Id. 
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also exists when an insider makes gifts of the information to a trading relative or friend.  The 
‘gifts’ rule is then qualified by the following sentence that, “the tip and trade resemble trading by 
the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”104  These various mandates 
of the definition of the personal benefit seem to be at odds with one another, where one requires 
a seemingly monetary gain while the other sets a much lower bar that a mere gift will suffice.105  
Dirks attempts to apply the fiduciary duty language set forth in Chiarella to the tipper- tippee 
relationship, but it does not define it clearly enough for courts to easily apply it to the attenuated 
tipping chains and the plethora of various relationships that have arisen in modern practice 
between tippees and their tippers.106 
II.   INTERPRETING DIRKS IN NEWMAN AND SALMAN 
 Since the Chiarella and Dirks cases, where the Supreme Court limited the SEC’s 
previous interpretations of insider trading under section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5, most of the cases 
to date have been prosecuted under the misappropriation theory of liability, so there has not been 
much new case law for the tipper-tippee category until Newman was decided in 2014.107  
Prosecution via the misappropriation theory appeared to be the SEC’s preferable method until 
                                                          
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Elizabeth Williams, Recipients of Corporate Information Other than Directors, Officers, Substantial 
Shareholders, or Associated Professionals as Subject to Liability for Trading on Material, Nonpublic Information, 
Sometimes Referred to as "Insider Trading," Within § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 
78j(b)) -- and SEC Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder -- Making Unlawful Corporate Insider's Nondisclosure or 
Manipulation of Information to Seller or Purchaser of Corporation's Stock, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 401, 2 (“Courts have 
thus determined or discussed the liability of various persons, not traditionally thought of as corporate insiders, for 
trading on inside corporate information in violation of 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder, including insiders' spouses ( §§ 5, 6) or other relatives ( § 7) or friends ( §§ 8, 9), employees of the 
corporation other than traditional insiders ( §§ 10, 11), business associates ( § 12) and prospective business 
combination associates ( § 15) of the corporation, journalists or other writers and printers ( §§ 13, 14), stockbrokers 
and financial advisors ( §§ 16, 17) as well as underwriters ( § 18) and finders ( § 19), and the tippees of any of these 
"quasi-insiders." The courts have also considered the potential liability under these same provisions of persons in 
other relationship to the corporation in question other than the groups mentioned above (§ 20).”) 
107 United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); 
United States v. Scop, 8846 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1988) (Cases decided under the misappropriation theory in the 
intervening time between Dirks and the 2014 Newman.). 
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the renewed campaign against insider trading began in 2009.108  The SEC and the DOJ had a 
large streak of successes and won 80 insider trading cases.109  The Supreme Court has not 
decided an insider trading case dealing with remote tippee liability and the personal benefit 
requirement in the thirty-three years that has elapsed since Dirks was decided.  This is true even 
though the securities markets have drastically changed and the economy has had enormous 
developments since that time.110  Newman was actually a relatively standard case out of the many 
that were brought and won by U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara since 2009 as part of his campaign 
against insider trading on Wall Street.111  The Second Circuit where Newman was litigated, hears 
many financial cases as it encompasses New York City and thus Wall Street, and had decided 
many previous insider trading cases.112  Newman is a case with much complexity however, and it 
brought to the forefront all of the holes that the Supreme Court left undecided surrounding issues 
of insider trading and demonstrated the disconnect between a greater than thirty year old judge 
made insider trading law regime, and the complex modern securities market.113  Dirks was a case 
                                                          
108 Roberta S. Karmel, A Critical Look at SEC Insider Trading Policies; Second Circuit Ruling Raises Questions 
about Future Prosecutions, (Jan. 31, 2016, 1:22 AM), http://www.ctlawtribune.com/id=1202719893299/A-Critical-
Look-at-SEC-Insider-Trading-Policies?slreturn=20160031012315. 
109 Walter Pavlo, Chiasson / Newman Appeal Heard On Insider Trading Conviction (Jan. 31, 2016, 1:22AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2014/04/23/chiasson-newman-appeal-heard-on-insider-trading-
conviction/#721a7b976c14 (“Preet Bharara’s victory lap on insider trading cases seems like a distant memory 
now.  His 80-0 winning record on insider trading prosecutions started with the big bust on October 16, 2009 with the 
arrest of Galleon Group’s co-founder Raj Rajaratnam.”). 
110 Markham & Harty, ECNs, 33 Iowa J. Corp. L. 865 (2008). 
111 DealBook, Preet Bharara’s Key Insider Trading Cases, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/09/business/dealbook/09insider-timeline.html#/#time337_8872 
(Moffat, Ex-I.B.M. Executive, Given 6 Months in Galleon Case; Longueuil, Ex-SAC Manager, Given 2 and Half 
Years; Jiau, Ex-Technology Consultant, Given 4 Years; Rajaratnam, Galleon Fund Chief, Given 11 Years; Skowron, 
Hedge Fund Manager, Given 5 Years; Brownstein, Fund Manager, Gets 366 Days; et. al.).  
112 Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015) (Infra footnote 1). 
113 Speech Fisher: The Extraordinary Events in Credit Markets Over the Last Sixty Days 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/1998/pf981015.  
Robin Greenwood and David Scharfstein, The Growth of Finance, 27 J. of Econ. Perspectives 2, 7 
http://www.people.hbs.edu/dscharfstein/Growth_of_Finance_JEP.pdf (In particular, the securities industry grew 
from 0.4 percent of GDP in 1980 to 1.7 percent of GDP in 2007, having peaked at 2.0 percent of GDP in 2001 
during the Internet boom.  Demonstrating an increase of 500% from 1980, when Dirks was decided, to 2001 which 
was immediately after the technology surge of the 90s.) 
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with a defendant whose plight was sympathetic, who tried to report the information of massive 
fraud at a company to a newspaper first, did not trade on the information himself but only for his 
clients, and was apparently only avoiding losses that were due to the expected imminent 
disclosure of the fraud.  The corporate tipper in that case was retired and received no benefit 
whatsoever, other than possibly a feeling of doing the right thing.  Additionally, his relationship 
to Dirks was not suspect because he too was only trying to reveal fraud within the company.  
Because of the special facts of Dirks it is not a good fit for, other than fraud exposing insider 
trading cases, and thus because “great cases like hard cases make bad law”114 we arrive at the 
problem of Newman where the Second Circuit is forced to apply vague statutory language that 
has been interpreted in a narrow highly specific context by the Supreme Court, to a case whose 
facts do not resemble Dirks in the least.  As mentioned, the prosecutorial streak of success in the 
Second Circuit continued until United States v. Newman, which brought the streak to a grinding 
halt when the Second Circuit dismissed a high profile case against two hedge fund managers, 
proclaiming a new heightened standard of what the interpretation of a breach of fiduciary duty 
by a corporate insider entailed.115  This ruling was interpreted by some to be a complete overhaul 
of insider trading prosecutions that were cracking down on fund managers over the last seven 
years.  Some commentators have even suggested that they are worried that it will lead to rampant 
abuse by Wall Street insiders until it is fixed.116  The requirements in order to sustain an insider 
trading conviction as articulated in Dirks had been found easily satisfied until this case.  Prior to 
the Newman decision a corporate insider who was entrusted with a fiduciary duty, breached said 
                                                          
114 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Homes dissenting). 
115 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
116 Patricia Hurtado, Prosecutor Fears Insider Leak ‘Bonanza’, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-
05/top-prosecutor-warns-of-insider-leak-bonanza-as-ruling-stands. (“With that increased benefit requirement now 
the law, an entire class of tippers who knowingly traffic in inside information are shielded from prosecution,” said 
John Zach, a former federal prosecutor who worked on the Newman and Chiasson case for the government and is 
now a partner at Boies, Schiller & Flexner.”) 
23 
 
duty by (a) disclosing confidential information to a tippee, (b) in exchange for a personal benefit, 
and (c) the tippee knew or should have known of the tipper’s breach, that is, he knew the 
information was confidential and divulged it for personal benefit, and then still used that 
information to trade in a security or tip another individual for personal benefit.117   
A.  The Second Circuit Interprets Dirks 
The Second Circuit interpreted Dirks to require that the tippee know of the breach by the 
tipper, as an extension of the reasoning that possession of MNPI in itself is not illegal.118  The 
chain of tippers and tippees that ultimately ended with the two hedge fund manager defendants 
Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson, were extensive. Newman was three persons removed 
from the original source and Chiasson was four persons removed.119  The tippees were thus 
multi-person removed and allegedly because of this did not know that the original corporate 
insiders had tipped the information.120  The Second Circuit made it clear that the defendant had 
to know that one of the tippers had breached a fiduciary duty to the corporation to be liable.  The 
only way that one of the tippers could have breached their duty was by receiving a pecuniary 
benefit or having, “a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is 
objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly 
valuable nature.”, thereby selectively choosing only this language from Dirks to interpret what 
was meant by the legislature to be a broad rule.121  This holding makes the pecuniary 
                                                          
117 Id.; Dirks 463 U.S. 646 (1983). (“Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not 
to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders 
by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.”) 
118 Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Circ. 2014). 
119 Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading After United States v. Newman, 125 
Yale L.J. 1482, 1487 (2016). 
120 Newman at 445. 
121 Id.  Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 385, 
385-386 (1990) (This article recounts the events that led up to the enactment of section 10(b) and argues that the 
provision was intended to empower the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate any practice that 
might contribute to speculation in securities or tend to move security prices away from investment value, save 
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requirement necessary to satisfy the test, whereas in Dirks it was merely sufficient.  At the same 
time the decision limits the Dirks holding of what satisfies the requirement of a personal 
pecuniary benefit.122  The Court concluded in Newman that there was no substantial exchange 
that represented at least the “potential gain of pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”123 The 
Second Circuit seemed to feel that the government’s case was too speculative.  Holding, that  (1) 
the tippers from Dell and NVIDIA did not know that Newman and Chiasson were trading on the 
information, (2) Newman and Chiasson did not know that the information was from an insider, 
and (3) that even if there was a satisfactory benefit to the insider from the original tippees who 
were close business colleagues, fellow church members, and even family friends, it was possible 
that the defendants did not have the requisite knowledge of the breach to support a conviction.124  
They did not ultimately decide that question however, because there was found to be no breach 
of duty because no sufficient personal benefit was exchanged.125   
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Differing Interpretation of Dirks  
Within the following year after Newman, the Ninth Circuit also decided an insider 
trading case involving tipper-tippee liability based on the Dirks framework.126  The Ninth Circuit 
convicted the tippee defendant and disavowed Newman’s reading of Dirks by saying, “To the 
extent that Newman can be read to go so far, we decline to follow it.  Doing so would require us 
                                                          
perhaps those Congress subjected to explicit controls in other parts of the Exchange Act.”  Drawn from legislative 
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to depart from the clear holding of Dirks that the element of breach of fiduciary duty is met 
where an ‘insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.’”127  
This was particularly interesting as District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of 
New York who was sitting by designation in the Ninth Circuit wrote the opinion.  Judge Rakoff 
had also previously issued other district court opinions highlighting the complexity of the 
Newman holding.128  Judge Rakoff has challenged the Second Circuit in the past, such as in 2009 
when he rejected a high profile settlement between the SEC and Bank of America, and also again 
rejecting a settlement between the SEC and Citigroup.129 He rejected the settlements because 
they lacked admissions by the defendant.130  The Second Circuit sharply rebuked him, vacating 
and remanding the case.131  Whereas the Second Circuit could force Judge Rakoff to follow their 
mandate in the Southern District, by sitting in the Ninth Circuit he was able to express freely his 
thoughts on how Newman should have interpreted Dirks.   
The defendants petitioned for a Writ of Certiorari from the Supreme Court for review of 
the Ninth Circuit decision by asking the following question, 
Does the personal benefit to the insider that is necessary to establish insider 
trading under Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), require proof of “an exchange 
that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a 
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pecuniary or similarly valuable nature,” as the Second Circuit held in United 
States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 15-137 (U.S. 
Oct. 5, 2015), or is it enough that the insider and the tippee shared a close family 
relationship, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case?132 
In United States v. Salman the defendant was alleged to have traded on information received 
from his future brother-in-law who received the information previously from a corporate insider 
at Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking group.133 Salman and his brother-in-law used the 
corporate information to execute nearly identical trades in securities issued by Citigroup clients 
shortly before the announcement of major transactions.134  Unlike in Newman the first prong of 
the analysis involving knowledge of the breach was clearly satisfied here.135  The cases differed 
as Salman knew that the information was coming from a corporate insider and it was also 
suggested that he felt it was wrong to trade on this information.136  The two cases were the same 
in one respect however, because as in Newman the primary tippee to the corporate tipper had 
provided simple career advice and intangible benefits, that were nearly identical to those benefits 
at issue in Salman.137  Defendant Salman’s brother-in-law, Michael Kara, provided his brother 
Maher Kara with occasional help with his work by helping him understand scientific concepts 
due to the fact that Michael possessed an undergraduate degree in chemistry.138  Where the two 
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cases’ holdings diverge is that the Ninth Circuit found the requisite personal benefit to be 
satisfied from these various relationship intangibles whereas Newman found them irrelevant.139   
 
C. The Key Differences Between Newman and Salman 
The Second Circuit’s Newman decision in contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s Salman decision 
adopted a much narrower view of Dirks than prior courts.140  The requirement for establishing 
insider trading can only be met they said, when there is proof that the tipper and tippee had a 
“meaningfully close personal relationship” and the insider received or might receive a monetary 
benefit or some other kind of valuable gain.141  The Second Circuit disagreed with the jury that 
the facts were sufficient to prove that the tippers derived some benefit from the tip and held that, 
“if this was a ‘benefit’ practically anything would qualify.”142  Thus the court felt that the tipper 
must receive something more than the, “ephemeral benefit of the value of the tippee’s 
friendship.”143  The Ninth Circuit in Salman disagreed with Newman that insider trading liability 
requires the tipper to receive a tangible benefit.  The court’s view was that requiring a tangible 
benefit would cause courts, “to depart from the clear holding of Dirks that the element of breach 
of fiduciary duty is met where an ‘insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading 
relative or friend.’”144   The court thus concluded that disclosing MNPI “with the intent to benefit 
a trading relative or friend is sufficient to establish the breach of fiduciary duty element of 
insider trading.”145  Following the Second Circuit’s reading of what is required for the personal 
benefit of Dirks would create a nonsensical loophole where insiders could trade to benefit a 
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relative or friend, to the detriment of the company, or for their personal gain as long as they did 
not receive any tangible compensation.  Although citing the same standard from Dirks, both 
courts put emphasis on different portions of the opinion’s language.  The Salman court focused 
on the line in Dirks where it states that the elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of 
nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a 
trading relative or friend.146  The Ninth Circuit used this line with an expansive interpretation of 
what is encompassed in the term gift.147  The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion of what constitutes a gift 
includes essentially what is meant in the standard dictionary definition of the word with the 
additional element required of a relationship between friends or family.148  Salman’s 
interpretation holds that evidence of a friendship or familial relationship between the tipper and 
tippee by itself, is sufficient to demonstrate that the tipper received a benefit.149  Newman, 
however, interpreted the term “gift” as something akin to certain tangible things and that 
intangibles as a reputational benefit must have potential to materialize into physical future 
earnings or something of similarly pecuniary value.150  
 Although the Salman decision has slightly different facts and thus was decided by an 
issue that Newman did not expressly reach, the holding does adopt a standard which would 
decide Newman’s facts differently than the Second Circuit did.  This creates a split among the 
two Circuits as to their interpretation of Dirk’s core holding on insider trading prohibition.151  
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The two cases’ facts provide telling examples of how cases will be decided in each Circuits’ 
framework for the time being.  In Newman the relationship between Newman and Chiasson with 
the original tipper was attenuated.  This appeared to weigh heavily on the Court’s analysis rather 
than focusing on the original tippee’s relationship to the original tipper of attending the same 
church and providing career advice.  Whereas, in Salman, the Ninth Circuit stressed the original 
tippee’s brotherly relationship to the original tipper.152  The two cases seemingly could have 
been decided on the issue of the knowledge of the defendants because Newman and Salman did 
not directly disagree on this point as Salman conceded knowledge of trading.  However, the 
holding that interpreted the same tipper-tippee relationship differently even though they 
consisted of almost identical relationship facts.  The relationships in terms of benefits received 
by the original tipper for purposes of finding a close personal relationship ship were ostensibly 
the same.  Whether there can be some cohesion in the decisions depends on the exclusivity of the 
holding in Newman of how it would be applied to cases where the relationship between the 
tipper and tippee is stronger or separately where the tippee’s knowledge is more assured.   
Once an identical case is placed before each court, based on the dicta of each decision the 
split will show itself to be deeper than it appears by just looking at its primary holdings because 
the pecuniary benefit aspect of the test would be more visible if the tipping chain was not as 
extensive as in Newman or if the relationship was stronger and thus familial as in Salman.153  A 
question that subsequently arises is whether these two parts of the test are not so much an “or” as 
they are two parts of a larger balancing test. Based on the Second Circuit’s denial to re-hear the 
case and that the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari, the holding in Newman stands 
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definitive in the Second Circuit.  From the court’s certitude in acquitting the defendants on all 
charges, it is unlikely that they would ever find a non-pecuniary benefit by itself sufficient for an 
insider trading conviction.154  This therefore calls for a deeper look at what the Supreme Court 
meant in Dirks, by examining the policy goals found in preventing insider trading and what the 
current trajectory of insider trading litigation is and should be. 
 The Ninth Circuit does not suggest that just any type of relationship, such as a casual 
friendship would be sufficient to infer a personal benefit under Dirks, but that a close personal 
relationship, such as that of a family member or close friend is required.  This is more in line 
with the intent of Dirks, which was intended to prohibit insiders from profiting on information 
that they do not own.  This reasoning thus extends to Newman type relationships between a 
funds’ analyst and their family friends that later gave the information to their bosses Newman 
and Chiasson.  Newman itself goes seemingly is contradictory in application the Second Circuit’s 
prior interpretation that it gave for what is a personal benefit in United States v. Jiau, 
Personal benefit is broadly defined to include not only pecuniary gain, but also, 
inter alia, … the benefit one would obtain from simply making a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend. 
Jiau.155  In Dirks the Supreme Court properly did not focus on the relationship between 
Dirks and the former insider who provided him with information, solely because there 
was no relationship between the two to categorize as close or casual.156  The rough logic 
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underlying the Dirks holding rings true under the broader standard of liability announced 
in Salman, that if the insider is getting a kickback for giving out the information, he is not 
doing it on behalf of the company.  Also by maintaining the prohibition of the same type 
of trading that Dirks meant to prohibit, specifically the type where an individual gets a tip 
from their shady business friend to profit for their own advantage, allows preservation of 
the positive market analysts’ research to analyze communications that are in line with the 
company’s business purposes rather than the individual’s interests.  The impropriety of 
giving information to family or close friends, is too likely to be biased with self-interest 
when it occurs to be considered a business decision profitable for the company.  The 
presumption of impropriety is too strong for a distinction to be made as Newman does 
between tangible and intangible payments, which leaves a loophole for insiders to  
benefit from insider trading through their tippees.157      
III.  SALMAN CAPTURES THE PRACTICAL REALITIES OF INSIDER TRADING   
 The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of when a personal benefit satisfies the Dirks standard 
is more tenable and is more in line with the practical realities of the marketplace.  To express it 
differently the Ninth and Second Circuits concur on the idea that the fiduciary breach and receipt 
of a personal benefit by the tipper are the inextricably intertwined.  I agree with the Ninth Circuit 
where it disagrees with the Second Circuit’s holding in Newman that a personal benefit can only 
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be found when pecuniary gain is involved, as this rationale flies in the face of the realities of 
modern day contracting and business principles.  A broader rule than Newman’s similar to the 
holding in Salman, is necessary for adequate policing and enforcement of insider trading.  
Without such a broader definition practices that essentially achieve the detrimental effects of 
reducing market integrity, violating notions of fairness, and decreasing economic efficiency 
would be achieved through virtually the same proscribed means simply because they were in a  
different form. The repercussions of Newman will most likely affect all types of insider trading, 
not just tipper-tippee liability.  An instance of the holdings of Newman influencing other areas of 
insider trading law can already be seen in the recent case of United States v. Conradt, et al., 
where a temporary insider-attorney, working on the IBM/SPSS deal told his friend Trent Martin, 
an analyst, about the deal.158  Martin told his roommate Thomas Conradt, a Euro-Pacific trader 
and a lawyer, who passed it along to three of his Euro-Pacific co-workers.  The government’s 
allegation rested on the theory that the traders had received the information in violation of a duty 
of trust.  The government argued that Newman applied only to classical insider trading cases and 
not misappropriation.  However, the district court cited Newman as being the applicable standard 
of personal benefit for both misappropriation tipping and classical tipping cases.159     
The Newman and Salman cases both try to home in on defining a remote tippee’s liability 
under the relatively unclear Dirks mandate for the panoply of possible situations that have arisen 
under its purview.160  The only ambiguity left by Salman’s reasoning that could allow the 
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Supreme Court to side-step the issue is that it is questionable whether it will apply in a more 
remote tipping situation as seen in Newman.161  Said another way, is Salman really contradicting 
Newman or is it just a more pronounced level of insider trading?  Newman has its own problems 
of vagueness however, because the substantial value and pecuniary benefit language leave too 
much to be decided on a case by case basis in order for it to provide a workable and consistent 
standard for the district courts to apply.162     
 As a result of this opacity in the standard, analysts, investors, and insiders are left to 
guess in most scenarios, aside from the prototypical tipper-tippee insider trades, whether their 
trading on the fringe of these two extreme cases will result in enormous liability or not.163  This 
realistically could lead to a problem of adverse selection, where the market will be left in the 
situation where the most unscrupulous analysts and insiders survive, pushing out the still 
productive to the markets but less risky analysts.  In this scenario the first category are 
encouraged to gamble big for the bigger profit because the loss due to insider trading conviction 
is largely unpredictable whereas the second is encouraged to leave the business altogether.164  
The dangers are real and the investing public will become ever more hesitant to invest in funds 
that have questionably high returns, and will err on the side of underinvestment because of the 
difficulty in deciphering which fund is an succeeding on an illegal type of insider trading and 
thus has an unbeatable advantage, to those who succeed from complex and innovative financial 
analysis .165 
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 The two tests set forth in Salman and Newman can and need to be reconciled, as recent 
applications by the lower courts show the potential for pecuniary gain or substantial value 
standard has a wide spectrum interpretations. The Supreme Court should rule on this issue to 
clarify and define explicitly what the test of insider trading liability is.  The ambiguous and all-
encompassing anti-fraud provision of section 10 (b) has survived under the auspices of the SEC’s 
10 (b-5) rule since Dirks and Chiarella, largely because of the clarifications that the Supreme 
Court has provided to it in the past.166  Without this clarity in the nuanced area of tipper-tippee 
liability as was given to the other requirements, the amorphous section 10 (b) standard will not 
live up to the needs of supporting the markets and its investors.167   
The Supreme Court could provide clarification to these two decisions without overruling 
either holding completely.  This would be the best way for them to achieve a comprehensive 
reading of Dirks while also limiting the definition of insider trading, so as not to return to the 
impractical equality of information standard of Cady, Roberts.  Neither the government nor the 
defendants would like to go back to the equality of information standard, as this would produce 
too much litigation for the government to possibly manage, would prosecute completely innocent 
conduct, and would eliminate any incentive for stock market analysts.  The Dirks standard 
instead should be read as a balancing test rather than as a strict checklist.  Insider trading can 
pervade any industry and all types of relationships.168  Therefore, the remedy to illegal insider 
trading must also be as flexible and pervasive as it is.  It also must be clear enough that it is not 
overreaching in its scope or unpredictable.  The main fear from overzealous insider trading 
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prosecution is that it will inhibits the functioning of market trading too much, and discourage 
individual work product by discovering new information through analysis, such as pricing the 
stock through a new formula or computer algorithm.  With the appropriate balancing test and 
encouragement of legitimately productive activity the Supreme Court’s interpretation of these 
proposed standards must include the pecuniary benefit and relationships tests, but also augment 
them to allow for full circumstantial evidence to be submitted in order to reflect reality.  That it 
will be the rare case rather than the common one, where inside information is accidentally 
exposed in a non-public format to a closely connected tippee.  This will give the much needed 
explanation of Dirks that it was meant to be inclusive rather than exclusive and to cover the 
exceptional situations such as the exposure of fraud.169  This would allow greater flexibility for 
the courts, allowing more circumstantial evidence and common sense through a lens of a 
threshold breach of duty to factor into the considerations of the extent of the relationship will 
help to prove intent more accurately .170   
A high court ruling would however be limited to the specific contours of enforcement 
under section 10 (b), which is now an eighty two year old provision, that did not explicitly 
purport to govern insider trading, yet is the primary enforcement mechanism of it.171  Since the 
limitation of its current language applying to the complexities of how the stock markets have 
developed since 1934 will exist regardless of what the high court decides the better and more 
comprehensive approach can only be accomplished by the legislature.172  Although another 
Supreme Court decision would help to clarify this issue and would definitely help to sure up 
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insider trading law in part, in order for there to be a fully comprehensive system of prosecution 
there needs to be a legislative enactment.  Insider trading deals with social networks within 
financial networks that are invariably complex.  The current state of the law leaves very little 
guidance for the myriad ways that insider trading can arise.  Each Court opinion will clarify 
some aspect of the problem to be fixed, but it will not provide the foundational principles 
needed.  Congressional action is needed for the most efficient solution, because the securities 
markets’ insider trading has too many variations to be governed only with such a blunt tool as 
section 10(b) and Rule 10(b-5).  One of the key determinants for the outcome of Dirks was that 
the Court crafted a standard for personal benefit around a circumstance that is only present in a 
small minority of insider trading cases.173  The reason that the Court searched so extensively for 
this solution was because of the seeming injustice that would have resulted from convicting an 
insider who was simply revealing fraud within a company, and an analyst who was in good-faith 
trying to make the fraud publicly known.174  Instead of circumscribing this as an exception to the 
rule, and walling it off from the rest of insider trading, the Court used a broader principle of 
fiduciary duty and thus had to define how such a duty could be breached in this specific context 
while hiding the real reasons for the decision.175   
 A fundamental step for reform of this area of securities law is to define the underlying 
policy rationale that decides why insider trading is wrong, which is primarily the province of the 
legislature.176  This can only be done through debate by Congress, the need for clarity and 
exaction in insider trading law can best be accomplished through a new set of legislation with 
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these specific idiosyncrasies of how insider trading occurs in mind.177  The way that this could be 
done is Congress could cast a net that is specific to insider trading, not simply under the guise of 
a general anti-fraud provision.  The legislation would finally provide an exact definition of 
insider trading as laid out in the balancing test described above by using a combination of the 
Newman and Salman standards.  The balancing test would also have certain ‘market productive’ 
exceptions allowed where it is determined that the benefit of select insider trading outweighs the 
costs.178  Thus, with a proper legislative debate and explanation, any fear of deterioration in the 
public’s confidence about the integrity of the securities markets would be allayed, or if still 
persisting to some extent would be to a lesser degree and would be limited in scope to the certain 
easily identifiable to investors promulgated circumstances not the market as a whole.179  Thus, 
Supreme Court clarification is much needed because Congress is very unlikely to legislate on 
this issue that it has refused to fix for nearly ninety years.  Despite the unwillingness of Congress 
to address this matter it would still be the ideal solution instead of the seeming unfairness to both 
defendants and the public, because of the hallmarks of legislative debate including the interests 
of the public, the decisions of which exemptions to allow, and what situations are the most 
responsive to public fears and perceptions.180   
 With the new reformulated Dirks balancing test codified as the main text of the 
enactment, and with a clear definition of insider trading the exceptions then would be listed in its 
subsections.  A prominent exception would arise from the Dirks scenario itself.181  This would be 
an exception for the exposure of fraud.182  This exception would be based on the reasoning that 
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revelation of fraud is productive for the market and investors as a whole.183  It would be illogical 
to burden corporate insiders with the choice of choosing between leaving the company or 
revealing the fraud with the possibility of being convicted of insider trading in the near future.184  
Society can easily justify the personal gains to a tippee and a tipper who benefit from exposing 
the fraud as a necessary consequence for the revelation.185  Whistleblowers in companies are 
rewarded for coming forward already, and in a fraud case, the role of the tipper is very similar.  
In this particular case the tip about the fraud will almost certainly be an avoidance of loss in 
trading on a fraudulently inflated stock, rather than a profitable capital gain, which limits the 
likelihood of abuse.186  This is because it is much less risky to sell stock believed to be 
fraudulently inflated, than to bet with borrowed money by shorting the stock.  None of the 
investors in Dirks shorted the stock after the fraud was made known to them, and they included 
many large investors.  Thus these exceptions, such as the reporting fraud exception that Congress 
knows are beneficial or benign could be stated explicitly.  In analogizing to section 922 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act187, instead of awarding a 
percentage of the fine the plaintiff recovers going to the whistleblower, the insider-whistleblower 
would be allowed to keep a portion of the insider trading profits.  There could be limitations set, 
such as only so long as exposure of one of the specially delineated activities was made known 
publicly within a reasonable time after the trades.  A standard to govern the conduct of the tipper 
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and the tippee in these situations would not turn on the benefit captured by them, thus 
eliminating the specious debate surrounding what a ‘personal benefit’ means.  It would be the 
same type of insider trading formerly illegal, but in a statutorily allowable form of it.  The easily 
decipherable threshold question would be whether a good faith effort was made to expose the 
fraud in a timely manner, and whether the fraud was actually exposed.188  Under these 
exemptions as explicitly defined in such categories, the SEC could formulate rules in its 
implementation to provide for beneficial insider information being made public and moving 
insiders out of the precarious position of uncertainty.  There should not however be a 
comprehensive exception for all analysts as some commentators may suggest.189  The argument 
for allowing analysts to trade on MNPI is that it causes efficiency in the markets by more 
accurately pricing stock through greater access to information.190  This is one of the primary 
reasons for the argument of complete deregulation of insider trading.  It is also partly responsible 
for the narrowing of the scope of insider trading in the case law because of the underlying policy 
rationale that analysts with inside information benefit the market by making this information 
public.191  While I do not disagree with the benefits of increased market information there must 
be a properly delineated set of acceptable ways to achieve this objective.  With proper legislative 
debate the core foundations of complete deregulation would be discredited.  With legislative 
debate this net gain to the efficiency of securities’ markets from inside trades would be disproven 
and demonstrated that it could be achieved in the same proportion and be more equitably shared 
through other means.  For further guidance, specific prohibitions of settings likely to lead to 
insider tips would be another helpful subsection.  Such settings in need of more regulation are 
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special one-on-one meetings or phone calls with analysts.192  These sessions invite exposing 
information, that under a fair approach would be made available by the most dedicated and most 
skilled analysts instead of the ones the insider likes the most.  By proscribing these ‘likely to 
result in insider trading scenarios’ it would align our capitalist system’s goal of free enterprise 
with the true goals of insider trading law. 
It can be said that the average investor buys securities for several reasons including in 
order to capture long term capital gains, preservation of buying power that an active market 
provides, and investment in favorable companies.193  This is a sustainable long-term strategy of 
growing one’s wealth.  Short sales for example, only prove valuable for a limited time as there is 
a lower bound on profits that can be made unlike stock growth which theoretically has no upper 
bound limit.194  Shorting also is not practiced by most unsophisticated investors, as it is generally 
riskier and requires quick and cheap access to buying and selling stocks.195  The price of a stock 
can be predicted in various ways, and generally represents market consensus of current earnings 
and earnings potential of the company.196  Efficiency of pricing is a beneficial aspect of a well-
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functioning market, but correct pricing is a function of investor expectations and is inherently 
subjective rather than having an underlying objective value.  This is true because of the general 
proposition that it is impossible to ever know beforehand, exactly what will occur in the future, 
especially what the price of a stock will be.  With current reporting requirements and government 
oversight197 the likely gains of information reaching the market by a trader informed by an 
insider is only one of timing.  The information will not be entirely excluded from the market, but 
will reach the market eventually anyway.  Additionally, the gain from the insider, trading earlier 
on this information, simply does not add anything to the market, but only acts as a transfer of the 
gain from the original holder of the securities to the insider-informed trader or transfer of loss 
from the insider holder of the securities to the new holder.  What the Supreme Court said in 
O’Hagan describing the unfairness that makes up the misappropriation theory’s prohibition rings 
true to all forms of illegal insider trading that, “An investor's informational disadvantage vis á vis 
a misappropriator with material, nonpublic information stems from contrivance, not luck; it is a 
disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or skill.”198  Thus, efficient pricing seems 
primarily appealing to a corporation who wishes to have a lower cost of capital sooner.199  But 
the problem with this reasoning is that it is not only achievable by releasing the information to a 
particular trader or analyst, but is entirely possible to achieve the same reduction of the cost of 
capital and sooner, for the firm who makes the information disclosure publicly.  The only 
remaining alleged benefit to the company is most likely secondary to the cost of capital benefit 
and anyways is entirely unquantifiable in value, namely winning the favor of the insider-
informed trader be it a hedge fund or a single family member investor.  Do we really want 
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companies trying to curry favor with high profile investors, instead of increasing their stock price 
through higher earnings and productivity?  However, it is also hard if not impossible to justify 
that the release of information through select disclosures is necessary to make firms better off in 
terms of borrowing interest rates.  A release of more information by a firm affects the stock price 
the same if not more efficiently by public disclosures rather than selective analyst disclosures.200  
Thus, even if there were firm specific reasons for early tips to analysts they seem universally 
hard to justify for most types of information which will come to be known eventually, such as all 
the information contained in earnings reports.201  More information in the market generally 
benefits society, by allowing the productive and profitable firms to receive a lower cost of 
capital, appreciation of stock prices, and thereby more investment.  However, selective 
disclosures of information are gains solely to the favored trader and shifts the wealth gains or 
loss that occurs when the information is incorporated into the stock’s market price.  In most 
cases, basically absent a never ending fraud, the information inevitably will reach the market.  
With the modern reporting requirements of the national exchanges it will not be released any 
sooner by private placement of the information to the favored analysts than to all capable 
investors.  The only difference would be on how we want these gains to be distributed.  Either 
based on performance and merit, or favoritism and discrimination.202  As a result of these 
selective analysts’ disclosures, when the information eventually reaches the average investor in 
most cases its possible utility to them has been virtually stripped from it completely. 
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The requirements of a friendship or familial relationship should be abandoned as an 
exclusionary feature, but still should captured in the law to a lesser degree of importance.203  
There is no reason why giving information to a stranger, if only less likely to occur, is less 
invidious and corrosive to the confidence in the markets and sense of fairness than giving it to a 
family member or close friend.204  Nor do the markets have to be so strictly enforced as to 
require a parity of information among all investors, as Dirks and experience have proved this to 
be harmful and also impossible to maintain.  Inequality of information among traders should not 
be decided by corporate insiders playing favorites.205  There is a marked difference of effect 
between autonomous discovery and a sneaky tip from an insider, on the public’s perception and 
its effect on corporate practices.206  As the misappropriation theory adopted a standard that 
incorporated a vast amount of confidential relationships anytime a person owed a duty not 
misuse the information entrusted to them207, unless authorized to do so with the consent of whom 
the information belongs to.  So too should tipper-tippee liability adopt a similar standard based 
on approval of the public through their Congressional representatives tailored to the intricacies of 
tipper-tippee situations. 
CONCLUSION 
 With the current political intrigue surrounding the broader implications of insider trading, 
a large amount of prosecutions brought by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Second Circuit 
under Preet Bharara, and the current split between the Second and Ninth Circuits this is an ideal 
time to define what insider trading means and providing the much needed clarity to both traders 
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and the government.208  Solving the discrepancies in section 10(b) and Rule 10(b-5) litigation is 
most important for creating a more efficient capital market to stimulate business development in 
such a tumultuous economic climate.  Tipper-tippee liability is the biggest obstacle to achieving 
this goal because it is the most uncertain and most insidious expression of the growing rift 
between the economic social classes in the United States.  The current state of confusion leaves 
one with the paradox of how it could be wrong for someone’s brother who was given a tip for no 
tangible benefit to give that information to another tippee to benefit them both, while it is not 
wrong for a tipper who gives information to a close family friend to benefit them, who then gives 
it to another tippee is not. The confusion creates many problems in the investment industry, such 
as a seeming impropriety of giving hedge funds preferential treatment over other investors, while 
creating a hesitancy for currently legal good faith disclosures by corporations to analysts, and an 
easily exploited loophole for future tippers and tippees.  This loophole allows the tipper to reap 
numerous intangible benefits worth considerable sums as long as it does not actually turn into a 
pecuniary gain of just a penny.  The Supreme Court should uphold the ultimate outcome of the 
Salman decision, but describe the balancing framework described above by defining a substantial 
personal benefit broader than solely as pecuniary gains.  The holding in Dirks and the legislative 
intent of Section 10(b) clearly demonstrate that the gain by the insider whether pecuniary or not 
are indicative proof of the harm to the corporation’s property rights, integrity of the markets, and 
individual investors that was meant to be prevented by Section 10(b) and the SEC Rule 10(b-5).  
The Supreme Court should elaborate on the intricacies of the current standing of tipper-tippee 
liability as it has developed through the courts precedent, to refine what they meant in Dirks.  
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This would be the first step in the road to recovery from the current vagaries.  Defining it at least 
more broadly to encompass more activity than the Second Circuit did in Newman, but also not so 
broad as to be without any practical limits.  The rule of Salman itself is a good start, and the 
Supreme Court should affirm this case.  However, affirming Salman will not resolve the myriad 
of other scenarios where certain market-beneficent exceptions should be excluded from 
prosecution.  It would take too long, and be a drain on the Supreme Court’s resources and time 
for it to decide all of these possible scenarios.  If the Supreme Court does not decide all these 
scenarios it will fall back to the lower courts to sort through the chaos, which will be ineffective 
as many of the courts disagree with each other on fundamental tenets of insider trading 
prosecution.  A prime example of this can be seen from the fact that the main author of the Ninth 
Circuit opinion was a District Court Judge from the Second Circuit sitting by designation.  If 
Congress decided to clarify this issue with new legislation it would reduce the issues that the 
Court would have to decide in future cases and create a sustainable federal insider trading 
enforcement regime for the future. With the current appeal to the Supreme Court in Salman the 
court should do its best to explain what they meant the present law to be under Dirks, to help 
Congress build a more stable structure from the existing insider trading laws.  Legislative action 
is the best way to achieve reform in insider trading law because it will give courts the proper 
tools to craft sustainable interpretations.  Setting an explicit standard, and not just a general anti-
fraud provision written eighty-two years ago, would allow companies to properly evaluate 
whether particular trading of securities with material non-public information is permitted, 
allowing businesses to plan ahead, and also to allot more concrete predictions of the risk 
involved with certain strategies of trading.209  With a specific allocation of what qualifies as 
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beneficial insider trading, and a specific prohibition against invidious tips, the goal of a free 
market will be better realized by all investors.  It will provide reassurance that any gains from 
disparity of information will be earned and not cheated from them.210   
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